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POLITICAL FACTORS IN THE
FORMULATION OF STRATEGY
Harold D. Lasswell
I am going to take the liberty of
analyzing the topic with which I am
dealing in a manner that may be a little
more comprehensive than perhaps was
originally intended. It will be necessary
to give rather extended consideration to
the term "political," since the word is
ordinarily used in many different ways.
Over the term "strategy" it is not
necessary for me to tarry. I assume that
we use the word as a convenient way of
talking about a basic pattern for employing instruments of power. It is
assumed that these power instruments
are utilized for the purpose of maximizing the degree to which the fundamental values of the body politic are
realized. Hence, any strategy includes
objectives and courses of action under
various contingencies. I suppose it is
obvious that a strategy of sea power
relates this instrument to all other instruments of total strategy; or, to express it another way, to total policy.
For many purposes it is convenient
to classify the instruments of power
according to the distinctive characteristics of the means employed. Let us
begin by saying that strategy uses arms,
goods, deals, and words. Perhaps you
think these are undignified ways of
talking about the four major divisions
into which strategy is often separated:
military strategy, economic strategy,
diplomatic strategy, and ideological
strategy.

It is also useful for some purposes to
classify strategy according to the distinctive effect which a given instrument
is capable of achieving in times of active
crisis. From this perspective we may
speak of destruction (or protection
from destruction) as the distinctive
effect of military strategy; of scarcity
( or abundance) as the effect of economic strategy; of the disunity of
leaders (or unity) as the distinctive
result of diplomatic strategy; and of
disunity of masses (or unity) as the
distinguishing effect of ideological
strategy.
Suppose we make a small table of
these terms for ready reference purposes:
Strategy
Military
Economic
Diplomatic
Ideological

Distinctive Means
Arms
Goods
Deals
Words

Distinctive Effects
Destruction (protection)
Scarcity ( abundance)
Disunity of leaders (unity)
Disunity of masses (unity)
There is no general agreement on the
terms appearing in this table, although
the categories are quite well-known. It is
not important to insist upon the labels,
if we understand one another.
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I believe it is evident that the first
two (arms and goods) are alike in
putting the emphasis upon capabilities,
and that the last two (the agreements
made or negotiated among leaders, and
the words addressed to large audiences)
put the emphasis upon intentions. However, no instrument is limited to its
distinctive effect It invariably has effects of every kind, in varying degree; in
war and in peace. Furthermore, alI the
organizations which are primarily
specialized upon anyone of the means
must make use of alI means in varying
degree. Obvious as this may appear to
be, it is nevertheless worth repeating,
since it is of the utmost importance to
catch hold of the contextual principle.
Another fundamental principle,
besides wholeness (contextuality) is the
principle of maximization of all values
sought by total policy. This basic postulate of strategy is continually being
revived in new words; and the revival,
by renewal of emphasis, often accomplishes a useful purpose. To choose a
recent example: The principle of maximization is often the point of the
modern slogan, "psychological warfare." What is being stressed is the
importance of achieving effects as economically as possible-by measures
short of total war, for instance; and by
the timing of all actions with the
psychological state of the opponent
always in mind. Hence, it turns out that
the general principle of maximizationwhich is a fundamental principle of all
strategy-is being reaffirmed in different
terms. The slogan "political warfare"
often performs precisely the same function by stressing what can be done to
gain the ends of policy by diplomatic
arrangemen t (with those in authority, or
disaffected leaders, for example). Such
considerations make a difference
wherever strategy is conducted on behalf of goal values which do not include
war itself as a positive value.
In the available time I propose to
limit the scope of the present analysis

by taking the "political" factor in the
formulation of strategy to mean: first,
considering the intentions of leaders and
masses; second, considering the potential impact of any instrument of policy
upon these intentions. In terms of our
table, I'm concentrating upon disuniting
(or uniting) leaders and masses; and I
am considering the impact of each of
the instruments of power, not only of
diplomacy and ideology.
In fact, my discussion will be narrowed much further. Because of the
fundamental importance of relating the
objectives of any special sphere of
strategy to the goal values which are
sought by the body politic for whom
the strategy is formulated, I shall devote
most of my time to the problem of
objectives.
The selection of objectives is enormously complicated in a democratic
setup like ours by the ambiguity of the
framework in which the strategist is
compelled to operate. In this country
there is always much ambiguity about
long-and middle-range-policies. Strictly
speaking, no one is authorized to tie the
hands of future generations of Americans. This applies to successive Congresses or Presidents. In addition to our
formalities, our pattern of thinking includes the expectation on the part of
our policy makers that national goals
may be differently interpreted through
time. Hence, no one arrogates to himself
the last word on the goal values of the
American people-and gets away with it.
Where does this leave the strategist
who is responsible for any aspect of
total American strategy? To say that it
"leaves him up in the air" doesn't help
us very much. And even though this is
true to some extent, the strategist need
not be nearly as far up in the air as
might appear from what I've just said. It
is possible to obtain some guidance.
First, there is a degree of consensus
about the goal values of American life,
and also about the translation of these
values into institutional terms. And,
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second, it is possible to estimate the
way in which policy objectives will be
interpreted under various future contingencies. Both these operations are essential in estimating basic political factors
in strategy_
Let us consider for a moment the
ideal values of the American tradition.
Each of us would express these basic
goals in somewhat different words. But
most of us would recognize that the
words that I'm going to use are about
equivalent to his own vocabulary preferences. The ideal preferences of the
American tradition are for the realization of human dignity in theory and in
fact. These words mean that we favor
the achievement of an American commonwealth in which values are shared
on the basis of individual merit, rather
than on the basis of the privileged status
of a family group into which one
happens to be born.
Let us spell this out more concretely
in terms of a fundamental way of
thinking about the social process. This
notion of social process, by the way, is a
handy intellectual gadget for examining
a great many problems connected with
strategy. A social process gets under
way whenever human beings affect one
another. Thus, we have a social process
today on a global scale; we have it on a
bipolar, regional, national, and local
scale. Whatever the social process is that
we are undertaking to explore, it is
convenient to talk about it in some such
general terms as these: "People pursuing
values through institutions using resources." This term "values" refers to
what people want; and the word "institution" means the patterns by which
values are shaped and shared in concrete
circumstances.
Let us apply this by making use of
eight words to talk about the values in
any social process that we want to
describe. I'm going to use eight words
for values:
Power, or decision making, a value
that is shaped and shared through the

institutions called government, politi·
cal parties, pressure groups, and the
like.
The wealth value is shaped and
shared through the institutions specialized to production and consumption;
more specifically, the corporations,
trade unions, and so on.
Another value is respect which includes such activities as the giving of
honors or of stigma. It includes the
discriminations and the distinctions in a
community.
Well-being is the value of physical
and psychological health. The institutions specialized to it provide medical
care, seek to prevent accidents, and so
on through a vast network of activity.
Enlightenment means access to facts
and opinions upon the basis of which
rational judgments can be made on
important questions. The institutions
are the agencies of civic instruction and
public information.
A further value is skill, the maturing
of latent talent into socially acceptable
expression. Distinctive institutions are
the organizations which concern themselves with levels of technical competence.
Another convenient value category is
affection. Here we are talking about
congenial personal relationships-family,
friendship cliques, and so on.
Last in this list of eight is rectitude.
We are talking about institutional patterns which specify standards of right
and wrong and apply them.
Now let us look at the goal values of
the American commonwealth in relationship to this statement about social
process. Having the general ideal of
realizing human dignity in theory and in
fact, we are in favor of moving in the
direction of a commonwealth in which
all values are very generally participated
in, as distinct from a community in
which all values are concentrated in a
relatively few hands. What this means is
that in terms of power we endorse a
decision-making process in which there
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is democratic participation, as distinct
from despotic dictation by a few.
In terms of wealth, we think of rising
standards of living throughout the community, as distinct from situations in
which the enjoyment of economic benefits is highly concentrated in very few
hands.
In terms of human respect, we are
against social castes.
In terms of well-being, we are in
favor of high levels of physical and
psychic health throughout the commonwealth.
So far as enlightenment is concerned,
we are in favor of universal civic instruction and freedom of the press.
In terms of affection, we are in favor
of human relationships in which there is
opportunity for friendly and loyal
human relationships to be maintained.
Then, in terms of rectitude, we want
to attain a universal sense of individual
responsibility for contributing to human
dignity.
This is an over-simplified way of
characterizing the sort of social process
toward which we want to move, according to our ideal objectives.
Well, let's stand back from this. What
are some of the implications for the
development of strategies? One point is
that our decision makers are multiplevalued, rather than single-valued; and,
especially, they are not centered on
power. If you compare the deeision
makers in top official and unofficial
positions in the United States with
those in Nazi Germany in its heyday, or
within the Soviet Union at present,
you'll be struck by the difference. Nazis
and communists are intensely focussed
on power.
For example: Very often American
decision makers are emotionally upset
when they listen to a situation being
analyzed in strictly "power" terms. (I'm
even referring to some specialists in the
Armed Forces, as well as to decision
makers who represent top civilian
groups in the United States). There are

frequent evidences of moral shock when
an analysis is stringently carried through
in power terms. The same attitude is
reflected in a different way in a crop of
embittered "baby Machiavellis" when
people are trying to transform themselves into individuals who are hardboiled about power.
You notice also a strange zigzag, in
which persons who at one moment are
insistent upon the consideration of
many values besides power, engage at
the next moment in most ruthless
power politics. This type of zigzag
reaction expresses lack of ease in dealing
with the power value, a lack of ease
which comes from our "multi-valued"
and "open" society.
This reaction also gives the United
States a singular reputation for hypocrisy, thanks to the difficulties that
arise in squaring many of our moralistic
formulations with many of our power
necessities. Now this reputation for
hypocrisy was also a reputation which
Victorian England enjoyed. To some
extent, of course, it is the prerogative of
all powerful units in the world to be
regarded as hypocritical by those who
are weaker, and in this sense we inherit
England's position. The United States
may have to get accustomed to being
regarded as a nation of hypocrites.
A second implication of goal values
for the choice of strategical objectives is
this: we aim at national security by
in ternational law and organization
rather than by world conquest or world
empire.
A third point: We're not politically
organized to plan and execute a socalled "preventive war." This is partly
because the idea is repugnant, and
partly a result of our unwillingness to
concentrate sufficient authority and
control.
A fourth point: We desire to change
the enemy's effective intentions by persuasion, if possible, rather by destroying
his or our capabilities. This comes from
our strong reliance on methods of
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bargaining and persuasion-bargaining in
the sense of deals with leaders; persuasion in the handling of propaganda,
advertising, and other mass-directed
forms of communication.
Fifth in this particular list: we have
little confidence in force as an instrument of policy save as a means of
nullifying hostile force and of keeping
the channels open for persuasion and
for peaceful internal evolution.
Next, our fundamental goal values
are of consequence when we undertake
to formulate in advance the end results
of the present crisis (end results to be
obtained, be it remembered, by measures short of total or limited war, if
possible).
What are the minimum objectives of
basic American policy in the present
crisis? I think we can be fairly definite
about the minimum objectives. We want
to bring into the effective control of the
Soviet Union (and elsewhere) policy
makers who accept inspection and control by the United Nations of arms, and
agree to arms reduction and limitation.
What are our maximum objectives?
Well, one hypothesis about our maximum objectives-not to be taken seriously, for I think it is highly improbable-is this: to impose detailed
United States institutions on the Soviet
world. That is to say, to reproduce as
many of our specialized institutions
concerned with each value as possible.
It is of the greatest consequence for
strategic thinking to arrive at workable
estimates lying somewhere between the
minimum I have specified (which is
pretty clear) and the ceiling I have
mentioned.
Next, in this list of implications, we
prefer a minimum use of coercion
against Allies and neutrals.
Next, I think there are as yet unrealized implications for the positive
objectives to be sought during the next
several years. It is notorious, isn't it, at
least among analysts of American
policy, that so far our policy formula-

tions have been primarily negative. We
have relied in publie (and frequently in
private) on formulating basic objectives
in terms of hostility to somebody elsesomebody's leadership, somebody's
institutional details. Problem: do we
have any positive objectives which can
be made potentially clarifying and
stimulating to our own people and to
the world as a whole? I think the answer
is "yes," and I would forecast, without
stopping to develop the point, that in
the years ahead we are likely to discover
that we are the ones who are the most
impatient with a nonindustrialized
world, and that we are the ones who
most want to take the initiative and
leadership in working closely with the
leaders and peoples of all countries in
order to develop worldwide industrialization; and that we propose to foster
worldwide industrialization with a ma.ximum of freedom and a minimum of
sacrifice of the values connected with
human dignity. To phrase it one way,
we are for "industry and democracy"
versus "industry and despotism." Our
aim is to cooperate in realizing a commonwealth of free men in an industrial
world. The purpose is to use modern
science and technology in order to
maximize the scope of human choice. I
refer to this in passing to indicate the
problems and solutions that appear
when you explore the fundamental strategic objectives of this nation.
Note that in formulating strategy for
a despotism the strategists are also in a
quandry. People who suffer the ambiguities of popular government frequently forget the ambiguities of a
dictatorial regime. This is not only
because the dictators change their
"line," if not their "spots," but because
the dictators change their key personnel, so that you get a considerable
readjustment by selective attrition. So
at any given moment the offieial has the
serious problem of deciding just how
long a given perspective will be safe to
play with. Hence, officials of despotisms
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become rather adroit in devising techniques for the evasion of responsibility,
thus developing a kind of creeping
paralysis in the formulation of middleand long-range programs.
Of course, in thinking about our
objectives, political factors must be calculated that go beyond the influences at
work in this country. We must take into
account the power factors moulding the
policies of present and potential allies.
There are special problems connected
with the liberation and restoration of
allies who are overrun.
There are thorny questions to be
disposed of in adjusting our immediate
and long-range objectives to programs of
cooperation with regimes having little
popular support. Here we meet the
danger with which we have become well
acquainted in recent times, of weakening the internal unity of the United
States by close cooperation with
regimes that have no basis of popular
support. Also, there is the danger of
weakening our appeal in the intermediate areas-and, ultimately, to
peoples of the Soviet orbit-by upholding a ruling group with whom we can
make excellent deals, but whose masses
may be alienated in time of crisis by
these arrangements.
Again, we must evaluate the helpfulness of regimes with a great deal of
popular support but neutralist in orientation. Perhaps their neutralism comes
from fear of internal disunity if their
policies are more positive, perhaps
through fear of being the theater of
active warfare. In any case, the strategic
problem is to estimate the policies open
to us for increasing our mutual identification with common objectives. And,
of course, we must evaluate the likelihood that the United States public will
show patience and consideration toward
other powers.
Turning now to another political
problem involved in the formulation of
strategy: the scale and timing of preparations. Let's assume that the strategist

has arrived at an estimate of the magnitude of the enemy threat, and of the
efforts needed to meet the threat.
Assume further that a high level of
continued mobilization presents novel
problems that must be taken into account in strategy formulation. One must
estimate the degree to which it is
possible to maintain the conviction that
the threat is as large as the strategist
thinks it is. Unless such convictions are
generally shared by leaders, all sorts of
other attitudes will reassert themselves.
One traditional attitude in this country
is the suspicion that everybody is likely
to exaggerate what he is interested in.
After all, this is an advertising culture. It
is a culture of Yankee traders. It is
assumed that whenever any professional
man tells you his services are needed, he
is exaggerating, and making a selfserving declaration.
If the level of popular conviction is
not high, it is necessary to avoid subjecting the standard of living to sharp
reduction. Otherwise it will be
impossible to maintain full cooperation
through long periods. It will be necessary to count on achieving our objectives, not by cutting civilian requirements, but by diverting the annual
increase of productivity into the defense
program.
If support is not intense, we must
also make sure that all important
elements recognize that they have high
and tangible stakes in the production
program. This applies to big and little
business, investors, managerial groups,
technical groups, farmers, and so on.
Then it is obvious that we must
estimate the possibility of keeping inflation under control (particularly by tax
measures) in order to diminish the
likelihood of alienating the fixed and
low income brackets.
We also have to estimate the degree
to which it is possible to prevent black
market operations, and the spread of
administrative corruption. Obviously,
we must consider the degree to which it
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is possible to mobilize an effective
demand for efficient law enforcement.
Further, we must consider the likelihood that political police measures can
be held to a minimum in the crisis. The
traditional American attitude towards
political police-toward the investigation of individual loyalty-is one of
great hostility. The problem is to estimate whether these attitudes can be
modified realistically without alienating
the unity of the country.
Further, we have to consider to what
extent it is possible to build up and
sustain common unity of outlook, not
only throughout the nation as a whole,
but especially among young people and
their families.
Strategy also calls for weighing the
political factors affecting the scale of
preparation by allies. I shall go no
further with this phase of the analysis.
Rather, I shall mention another
major element: calculating the significance of political factors affecting the
possible scale and timing of losses in
active warfare. This, I shall not have
time to deal with.
The formulation of strategy calls for
the evaluation of political factors in
connection with the choice of instruments of warfare and the mode of their
application. I shall mention only a few
ramifications of this extraordinarily important matter. Plainly, one has the task
of estimating the role of specific bases
under various conditions of political
reliability. One has the problem of
weapon balance. Weapon choice is not
only a matter of engineering comparisons, but of weighing the chances of
continued political support for various
weapons. In some cases this means
making concessions to the ease with
which the support of certain industrial
and territorial groups can be mobilized,
and, as I heard some one remark,
attention to the popular vogue of various weapons, even if this presents the
problem of keeping up-to-date with
popular education in the comic strips.

Connected with weapon choice and
application is estimating the effect of
appearing to play the role of the aggressor (and also of appearing to play a
passive role).
Again, there is the problem of calculating the effect of introducing new and
"inhuman" weapons, or of following
suit. It is worth considering the possibility of developing and introducing
new and humane weapons in order to
avoid negative political effects. Some
years ago the "paralysis weapon" was
suggested as the ideal weapon for
humanitarians. The idea was to treat
large masses of the population the same
way as the individual patient in the
hospital when you put him under an
anaesthetic.
We also have the task of estimating
the usefulness of a weapon as a deterrent and as a builder of confidence.
Historically, of course, this has been one
of the many role played by naval
demonstrations.
Further, target selection for strategic
operations calls for the consideration of
political elements.
I turn now to another set of strategic
calculations in which political factors
cut an important figure: the orientations and capabilities of the enemy. I
shall first mention the problem of estimating the weight assigned to political
factors in the enemy's strategic thinking. What elements of his own population does he regard as liable or unreliable for various activities? What elements of other populations does he
believe to be helpful under various
circumstances? What are his expectations about our policy and that of other
nations? (We note in this connection the
chronic underestimation of the fighting
potential of the United States by
despotisms).
There is also the problem of the
political responsiveness of the enemy to
measures short of war, and to war itself.
Here the greatest question is whether
significant elements in the ruling elite
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can be brough t to recognize, by procedures short of total war, that they
have more to gain by cooperation than
by noncooperation with the rest of the
world.
It is also necessary to assess the
effect of internal cleavages, if they
develop, upon the policy of an opponent Will the development of antagonisms among the peoples of the
Soviet world lead to even greater consolidation of garrison police states, or
will it bring about a steady drift toward
peaceful cooperation on the part of the
top elite? We have in mind actual and
potential cleavages separating Soviet cultures and nationalites, urban and rural
populations, and the like.
Let me bring this analysis to a close.
Political factors, I have said, enter into
the formulation of partial or total
strategy_ Political considerations relate
especially to the intentions of ourselves

and others, and also to the impact of
every instrument of power upon intentions. The aim of strategy is to maximize the realization of the goal values of
the body politic in a democratic commonwealth, and of the ruling few in a
despotism. Political factors enter at least
into the formulation of strategy in (1)
the choice of objectives on the basis of
our goal values and those of our present
and potential allies; (2) the estimation
of the possible scale and timing of
preparations at home and on the part of
allies; (3) the scale and timing of possible losses by our own forces and our
allies; (4) the choice of war instruments
and their mode of application; (5) the
estimation of the political considerations that figure in the strategical thinking of the enemy; and (6) the weighing
of the political responsiveness of the
enemy to measures short of war and to
war itsel£
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